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Rather uneven collection of facts and opinions o Amazon Довольно неравномерный сбор фактов и мнений Melko epätasainen kokoelma faktoja ja mielipiteitä Ganska ojämn insamling av fakta och åsikter Rather uneven collection of facts and opinionsThe author Leon Aron seems to have done a big effort in collecting articles of about a dozen of high-level authorities of Russian studies to one volume. Actually, he mentions that the task was, to his surprise, not at all difficult. Everybody he turned to, at once accepted his invitation. Many of the monographs published here were not produced for this occasion but were speeches presented on other occasions. Most of them contain summaries of statistical surveys, some by official Russian institutions, some by unofficial comparative sources. In most of them the distinct phases of economic development and crises of Putin's time, the years since the turn of the millennium, form the skeleton of the story. Other divisions in addition to the time phases are spatial by the size of the social sphere: a million cities plus three other sizes down to backward village settlements far away from the population centers. Still another analytical aspect is division by social classes. Much text and much information, and the general attitude of the individual authors is critical. In my opinion, Leon Aron successfully combines the contents of the individual texts in his general conclusions to a very short summary: "As the authors of these masterful chapters have shown, obscured today by the fog of war and induced patriotic frenzy, the structural problems are quite real and are only likely to grow wider and deeper, potentially morphing into multiple converging crises." From my personal point of view reading, this book did not even nearly reach the level of another Putin book, a 300-page monograph Vladimir Putin: The Whole Story by Arvo Tuominen, also published at Amazon. Perhaps otherwise 4 stars to this Aron book, but comparison with Tuominen's book lowers this book to the rank of only 3 stars. Довольно неравномерный сбор фактов и мненийАвтор Леон Арон, кажется, приложил огромные усилия, чтобы собрать в один том статьи около десятка высокопоставленных авторитетов в области русистики. На самом деле он упоминает, что задача, к его удивлению, была совсем не сложной. Все, к кому он обратился, сразу приняли его приглашение. Многие из опубликованных здесь монографий не были подготовлены для этого случая, но были выступлениями по другим поводам. Большинство из них содержат резюме статистических наблюдений, некоторые из официальных российских институтов, некоторые из неофициальных сравнительных источников. В большинстве из них отдельные фазы экономического развития и кризисы путинского времени, годы, прошедшие с начала нового тысячелетия, составляют костяк этой истории. Другие подразделения, помимо временных фаз, пространственны по размеру социальной сферы: миллион городов плюс три других размера вплоть до отсталых деревенских поселений, удаленных от населенных пунктов. Еще один аналитический аспект - это разделение на социальные классы. Много текста и информации, и общее отношение отдельных авторов критическое. На мой взгляд, Леон Арон успешно объединяет содержание отдельных текстов в своих общих выводах в очень краткое изложение: «Как показали авторы этих мастерских глав, сегодня скрытые туманом войны и вызванным патриотическим безумием, структурные проблемы вполне реальны и, вероятно, будут только расширяться и углубляться, потенциально трансформируясь во множественные сходящиеся кризисы». С моей личной точки зрения чтения, эта книга даже близко не достигла уровня другой книги Путина, 300-страничной монографии Арво Туоминена «Владимир Путин: вся история», также опубликованной на Amazon. Возможно, в противном случае этой книге Арона 4 звезды, но сравнение с книгой Туоминена понижает ее рейтинг до 3 звезд. Melko epätasainen kokoelma faktoja ja mielipiteitäKirjoittaja Leon Aron näyttää tehneen suuria ponnisteluja kerätäkseen noin tusinan korkean tason venäläistutkimuksen auktoriteetin artikkelit yhteen niteeseen. Itse asiassa hän mainitsee, että tehtävä ei ollut hänen yllätyksensä ollenkaan vaikea. Kaikki, joiden puoleen hän kääntyi, hyväksyivät heti hänen kutsunsa. Monet täällä julkaistut monografiat eivät olleet tätä tilaisuutta varten, vaan ne olivat muissa tilaisuuksissa pidettyjä puheita. Suurin osa niistä sisältää tiivistelmiä tilastotutkimuksista, osa Venäjän virallisista instituutioista, osa epävirallisista vertailevista lähteistä. Useimmissa niistä Putinin aikaiset taloudellisen kehityksen ja kriisit, vuodet vuosituhannen vaihteesta, muodostavat tarinan rungon. Muut jaot aikavaiheiden lisäksi ovat sosiaalisen sfäärin koon mukaan tilallisia: miljoona kaupunkia plus kolme muuta kokoa takapajuisiin kyläasutusalueisiin, jotka ovat kaukana asutuskeskuksista. Vielä toinen analyyttinen näkökohta on jakautuminen yhteiskuntaluokkiin. Paljon tekstiä ja paljon tietoa sekä yksittäisten kirjoittajien yleinen asenne on kriittistä. Mielestäni Leon Aron yhdistää onnistuneesti yksittäisten tekstien sisällön yleisissä johtopäätöksissään hyvin lyhyeksi yhteenvedoksi: "Kuten näiden mestarillisten lukujen kirjoittajat ovat osoittaneet, sodan sumun ja isänmaallisen kiihkon varalta tänään, rakenteelliset ongelmat ovat melko todellisia ja kasvavat todennäköisesti vain laajemmiksi ja syvemmiksi, mahdollisesti muuttuen useiksi lähentyviksi kriiseiksi." Omalta kannaltani tämä kirja ei yltänyt läheskään toisen Putinin kirjan, Amazonissa myös julkaistun Arvo Tuomisen 300-sivuisen monografian Vladimir Putin: The Whole Story tasolle. Ehkä muuten 4 tähteä tälle Aronin kirjalle, mutta vertailu Tuomisen kirjaan alentaa tämän kirjan vain 3 tähden luokkaan. Ganska ojämn insamling av fakta och åsikterFörfattaren Leon Aron tycks ha gjort en stor insats i att samla artiklar om ett dussintal ryska studier på hög nivå i en volym. Egentligen nämner han att uppgiften, till hans förvåning, inte alls var svår. Alla han vände sig till accepterade genast hans inbjudan. Många av de monografier som publicerats här producerades inte för detta tillfälle utan var tal som hölls vid andra tillfällen. De flesta av dem innehåller sammanfattningar av statistiska undersökningar, några från officiella ryska institutioner, några från inofficiella jämförande källor. I de flesta av dem utgör de distinkta faserna av ekonomisk utveckling och kriser på Putins tid, åren sedan millennieskiftet, skelettet i berättelsen. Andra indelningar utöver tidsfaserna är rumsliga beroende på storleken på den sociala sfären: en miljon städer plus tre andra storlekar ner till efterblivna bybebyggelser långt borta från befolkningscentra. Ännu en analytisk aspekt är uppdelning efter samhällsklasser. Mycket text och mycket information, och den allmänna attityden hos de enskilda författarna är kritisk. Enligt min mening kombinerar Leon Aron med framgång innehållet i de enskilda texterna i sina allmänna slutsatser till en mycket kort sammanfattning: "Som författarna till dessa mästerliga kapitel har visat, i dag skymd av krigets dimma och framkallad patriotisk frenesi, de strukturella problemen är ganska verkliga och kommer bara att växa sig bredare och djupare, potentiellt omvandlas till flera konvergerande kriser." Ur min personliga synvinkel när jag läste nådde den här boken inte ens samma nivå som en annan Putin-bok, en 300-sidig monografi Vladimir Putin: The Whole Story av Arvo Tuominen, också publicerad på Amazon. Kanske annars 4 stjärnor till denna Aron-bok, men jämförelse med Tuominens bok sänker denna bok till rangen endast 3 stjärnor.
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Huomautukset Remarks ЗамечанияPagetop |
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| 2. 1,148,148,his,rus,20211225,20211227,3,Leon Aron: Putin's Russia | ??? | |
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| 1 | 0001 | Contents |
| 4 | 000101 | Introduction |
| 8 | 01 | PART I POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERALISM |
| 9 | 0101 | Political Origins and Implications of the Economic Crisis in Russia SERGEI GURIEV |
| 9 | 010101 | Russian Economic Miracle—and the New Stagnation |
| 12 | 010102 | Why a Slowdown? |
| 16 | 010103 | Political Implications of the Stagnation |
| 16 | 010104 | What Next? |
| 17 | 010105 | Conclusions |
| 20 | 0102 | Four Russias and a New Political Reality NATALIA ZUBAREVICH |
| 20 | 010201 | Center-Periphery Model of Russian Space: Four Diverging Russias |
| 23 | 010202 | Postimperial Syndrome: The Four Russias Choice |
| 24 | 010203 | The 2014 Crisis and the Four Russias: Impact and Consequences |
| 25 | 010204 | Scenarios for the Four Russias |
| 28 | 010205 | Conclusion |
| 30 | 0103 | Russian Federalism: Reality or Myth? EVGENY GONTMAKHER |
| 31 | 010301 | The Evolution of Contemporary Russian Federalism |
| 32 | 010302 | Is Russia a Unitary State? |
| 36 | 010303 | What Next? |
| 41 | 02 | PART II Regime, Ideology, Public Opinion, and Legitimacy |
| 42 | 0201 | Resources of Putin’s Conservatism LEV GUDKOV |
| 42 | 020101 | The Essence of the Regime |
| 54 | 020102 | Regime and Society: Scenarios to 2018 |
| 57 | 020103 | Conclusion |
| 60 | 0202 | Evolution of Values and Political Sentiment in Moscow and the Provinces MIKHAIL DMITRIEV |
| 60 | 020201 | The First Wave of Protests |
| 61 | 020202 | Factors Contributing to Changing Values and Political Attitudes |
| 63 | 020203 | Conclusion |
| 67 | 0203 | Triumphs and Crises of Plebiscitary Presidentialism KIRILL ROGOV |
| 67 | 020301 | Plebiscitary Presidency and Stable Supermajority |
| 73 | 020302 | From Supermajority to Simple Majority |
| 75 | 020303 | Supermajority and the Institutional Dynamics of the Plebiscitary Regime |
| 80 | 020304 | A Quest for a New Supermajority |
| 84 | 03 | PART III Civil Society: Defeat and Radicalization? |
| 85 | 0301 | The Difficult Birth of Civic Culture BORIS MAKARENKO |
| 86 | 030101 | What Makes Russians Subjects Rather than Citizens? |
| 87 | 030102 | Citizens, Come What May |
| 89 | 030103 | Civil Society |
| 90 | 030104 | What Has Civic Culture Achieved? |
| 91 | 030105 | The Authorities’ Response |
| 92 | 030106 | Medium-Term Projection: The Civic Culture Development Path |
| 94 | 030107 | Conclusion |
| 98 | 0302 | Moscow to Swallow Putin: The Rise of Civil Society in Russia’s Capital DMITRY ORESHKIN |
| 98 | 030201 | Citizen Oversight of Elections |
| 105 | 030202 | Civil Society Fills the Vacuum |
| 106 | 030203 | The Regime’s Response |
| 111 | 030204 | Traditional Islam and the Tatar and Bashkir Communities |
| 113 | 030205 | The Salafi Movement |
| 117 | 030206 | Migration Effects on Russia’s Muslim Community |
| 120 | 030207 | Conclusion |
| 127 | 0303 | Conclusion |
| 130 | 0304 | Acknowledgments |
| 131 | 0305 | About the Authors |
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1 (4) To quote Boris Makarenko, “The rallying around the flag buys time for the regime but does not resolve a single socioeconomic problem.” 2 (4) It is these postponed crises—their causes and their impact, on the one hand, and the regime’s engagement with them, on the other—that this book is about. 3 (14) The investors are leaving Russia for a very simple reason: Russia’s investment climate (the rule of law and protection of investors’ rights) is very poor—at least relative to competing capital destinations. For a high-income, urbanized, and educated country, Russia is unusually corrupt. 4 (14) The level of corruption in Russia is on par with that of the poorest countries in the world. 5 (15) Now that other sources of growth such as rising commodity prices, cheap labor, and spare production capacity have been exhausted, growth in investment is unlikely without reform, and therefore, stagnation is inevitable. 6 (24) Anti-Western sentiments prevail across all four Russias, and restoration of the empire is generally viewed favorably. Survey results suggest that the modernized layer of the urban population espousing European values and rationally perceiving the world is scarce even in the largest cities of Russia. 7 (26) Back to USSR/Sliding toward Totalitarianism. 8 (26) Hard Authoritarianism. 9 (27) Returning to the Modernization Path after a Short Relapse of the Postimperial Syndrome. 10 (28) Forcibly Toppling the Existing Regime through Revolution. 11 (30) Finland’s Parliament (Sejm) was vested with extensive powers and even printed its own currency. 12 (30) Until his death in 1953, USSR leader Joseph Stalin enjoyed as much power as Russian emperors. 13 (32) At first glance, Vladimir Putin’s Russia appears to be a rigidly unitary state where constitutional federalism exists only on paper. 14 (36) On the other hand, most Russian regions are toxic for businesses, large as well as small, which ultimately explains Russia’s generally unfavorable investment climate. 15 (65) many reasons to believe that current attitudes remain transitional and even fickle. Progress and regress replace one another in a kaleidoscopic fashion, sometimes occurring simultaneously. This means that the evolving mass consciousness might still present quite a few surprises by 2018. 16 (87) There is a well-known concept of three Russian nations with social differentiation depending on where individuals live: active and competitive populations are concentrated in major cities, stagnation is common in small towns and villages, and rising tensions are prevalent in midsized cities.8 This taxonomy fits rather well with the three types of social capital accumulated by various sections of Russian society, as identified by Lev Gudkov. 17 (94) Although the Russian public has a huge stock of patience, which gives the government considerable room for maneuver, it is very hard to predict how the authorities will behave when the social policy resources begin to dry up. 18 (109) The chess match between the Russian president and Moscow is entering its endgame. It is not likely to be peaceful. 19 (128) Yet, it is hard to disagree with Makarenko that “civic culture already exists” in Russia. And, fortunately for Russia, the choice of whether it continues to exist is “not up to the Russian government alone.” The public debate, Oreshkin points out, may be “suppressed and forced far below the surface,” but it has not disappeared, and neither has the conflict between the increasingly reactionary regime and the advanced part of the “nascent but growing” civil society, flexible and capable of innovative thinking, self-financing, and efficiency. 20 (129) As the authors of these masterful chapters have shown, obscured today by the fog of war and induced patriotic frenzy, the structural problems are quite real and are only likely to grow wider and deeper, potentially morphing into multiple converging crises. |
| 1 | 20211225 | +40p | =41p | 28% | ************** |
| 2 | 20211226 | +57p | =98p | 66% | ********************************* |
| 3 | 20211227 | +50p | =148p | 100% | ************************************************** |