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A book above my capacity of comprehension o Amazon Книга выше моего понимания Kirja, joka ylittää ymmärrykseni A book above my capacity of comprehensionI was disappointed in my own capacity of following the argumentation. Yet, this is one of the famous works of Keynes. But when reading I felt myself buried below the huge mass of too detailed quantitative information. No way to appreciate the significance of the issues. Soon also I had the disturbing feeling of the text being mere too easy hindsight instead of genuine wisdom. Only in one chapter could I moderately follow the argumentation, Chapter VI. Europe after the Treaty. Because of these feelings of not reaching the message of argumentation and disappointment my assessment of this book is only two stars. Книга выше моего пониманияЯ был разочарован своей способностью следить за аргументацией. Тем не менее, это одна из известных работ Кейнса. Но при чтении я чувствовал себя погребенным под огромной массой слишком подробная количественная информация. Нет возможности оценить значимость вопросов. Вскоре у меня возникло тревожное ощущение, что текст был просто слишком легкой ретроспективой, а не подлинной мудростью. Только в одной главе я мог умеренно проследить аргументацию, в главе VI. Европа после Договора. Из-за этих чувств недонесения аргументации и разочарования моя оценка этой книге всего две звезды. Kirja, joka ylittää ymmärrykseniOlin pettynyt omaan kykyyni seurata argumentaatiota. Tämä on kuitenkin yksi Keynesin kuuluisimmista teoksista. Mutta lukiessani tunsin olevani haudattu yksityiskohtaisten määrällisten tietojen valtavan massan alle. En mitenkään pystynyt arvioimaan asioiden merkitystä. Pian tuli myös hämmentävä tunne siitä, että teksti oli pelkkä liian helppoa jälkiviisautta aidon viisauden sijaan. Vain yhdessä luvussa saatoin seurata argumentaatiota kohtuullisesti, luvussa VI. Eurooppa sopimuksen jälkeen. Näiden väitteiden ja pettymysten sanoman saavuttamatta jättämisen tunteiden vuoksi arvioni tästä kirjasta on vain kaksi tähteä.
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Huomautukset Remarks ЗамечанияPagetop |
| Parametre lines at the beginning of the reader notes | ||
| 1. Keynes-Consequences-ajk*$0# | ??? | |
| 2. 1,117,117,eco,eng,20220217,20221232,4,John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace | ??? | |
| 3. Amazon Link to source of purchased ebook... | ??? | |
| 4. eng Link to Ajk review at source of purchased ebook... | ??? | |
| 6 | Sisällysluettelo Contents Содержание (Code: (1,2,3,4,5)) | PREFACE 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 6 | Sisällysluettelo Contents Содержание (Code: (1,2,3,4,5)) | Chapter I. Introductory 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 9 | Sisällysluettelo Contents Содержание (Code: (1,2,3,4,5)) | Chapter II. Europe before the War 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 10 | 000301 | I. Population |
| 11 | 000302 | II. Organization |
| 12 | 000303 | III. The Psychology of Society |
| 13 | 000304 | IV. The Relation of the Old World to the New |
| 15 | 000304 | Chapter III. The Conference 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 25 | 000304 | Chapter IV. The Treaty 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 46 | 000304 | Chapter V. Reparation 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 46 | 000601 | I. Undertakings given prior to the Peace Negotiations |
| 54 | 000602 | II. The Conference and the Terms of the Treaty |
| 66 | 000603 | III. Germany's Capacity to pay |
| 66 | 00060301 | 1. Immediately Transferable Wealth |
| 72 | 00060302 | 2. Property in ceded Territory or surrendered under the Armistice |
| 73 | 00060303 | 3. Annual Payments spread over a Term of Years |
| 83 | 000604 | IV. The Reparation Commission. |
| 87 | 000605 | V. The German Counter-Proposals |
| 89 | 000605 | Chapter VI. Europe after the Treaty 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 99 | 000605 | Chapter VII. Remedies 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 101 | 000801 | 1. The Revision of the Treaty |
| 105 | 000802 | 2. The Settlement of Inter-Ally Indebtedness |
| 110 | 000803 | 3. An International Loan |
| 112 | 000804 | 4. The Relations of Central Europe to Russia |
| 117 | 000804 | end 1: 117: 117: 4: |
| 117 | 000804 | ### 20220121 2* 1: 117: 117: 4: |
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1 (7) But the spokesmen of the French and British peoples have run the risk of completing the ruin, which Germany began, by a Peace which, if it is carried into effect, must impair yet further, when it might have restored, the delicate, complicated organization, already shaken and broken by war, through which alone the European peoples can employ themselves and live. 2 (12) In fact, it was precisely the inequality of the distribution of wealth which made possible those vast accumulations of fixed wealth and of capital improvements which distinguished that age from all others. 3 (12) The immense accumulations of fixed capital which, to the great benefit of mankind, were built up during the half century before the war, could never have come about in a Society where wealth was divided equitably. 4 (13) There were two pitfalls in this prospect: lest, population till outstripping accumulation, our self-denials promote not happiness but numbers; and lest the cake be after all consumed, prematurely, in war, the consumer of all such hopes. 5 (13) Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory,—the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you. 6 (21) Victory would only have been possible to one who had always a sufficiently lively apprehension of the position as a whole to reserve his fire and know for certain the rare exact moments for decisive action. And for that the President was far too slow-minded and bewildered. 7 (21) The reader must remember that the processes which are here compressed into a few pages took place slowly, gradually, insidiously, over a period of about five months. 8 (25) Thus in the last act the President stood for stubbornness and a refusal of conciliations. 9 (29) In short, not only are German sovereignty and German influence extirpated from the whole of her former oversea possessions, but the persons and property of her nationals resident or owning property in those parts are deprived of legal status and legal security. 10 (45) Thus the great waterways of Germany are handed over to foreign bodies with the widest powers; and much of the local and domestic business of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dresden, Stettin, Frankfurt, Breslan, and Ulm will be subject to a foreign jurisdiction. 11 (45) Thus the Economic Clauses of the Treaty are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in future. So situated, Germany is to make payments of money, on a scale and in a manner to be examined in the next chapter. 12 (57) By December 11 the Prime Minister had capitulated. His Final Manifesto of Six Points issued on that day to the electorate furnishes a melancholy comparison with his program of three weeks earlier. I quote it in full: 13 (57) socially and industrially. 5. Rehabilitation of those broken in the war. 6. A happier country for all." 14 (57) A vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Crucifixion of Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National Debt. 15 (58) Apart from other aspects of the transaction, I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible. 16 (59) As soon as it was admitted that it was in fact impossible to make Germany pay the expenses of both sides, and that the unloading of their liabilities upon the enemy was not practicable, the position of the Ministers of Finance of France and Italy became untenable. 17 (59) Thus a scientific consideration of Germany's capacity to pay was from the outset out of court. 18 (80) I reach, therefore, the final conclusion that, including all methods of payment—immediately transferable wealth, ceded property, and an annual tribute—$10,000,000,000 is a safe maximum figure of Germany's capacity to pay. In all the actual circumstances, I do not believe that she can pay as much. 19 (88) This reduces the offer to $7,500,000,000, as compared with the $40,000,000,000 which, according to my rough estimate, the Treaty demands of her. 20 (89) If the promised negotiations are really conducted on these lines, they are not likely to be fruitful. It will not be much easier to arrive at an agreed figure before the end of 1919 that it was at the time of the Conference; and it will not help Germany's 21 (90) This chapter must be one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. 22 (90) The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others,—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. 23 (90) It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. 24 (91) Those who sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women and children." |
| 1 | 20221217 | +8p | =9p | 8% | **** |
| 2 | 20221218 | +7p | =16p | 14% | ******* |
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| 5 | 20221221 | +5p | =94p | 80% | **************************************** |